摘 要

本文立论有三：（1）在动态宏观的视野下，交易费用分析框架无论从其基础理论逻辑和核心理论范畴，还是主要理论结论来看，都是不成立的；（2）从交易费用的角度来进行制度分析，不但不能完全把握制度的本质和经济绩效的根源，而且会错误地处理许多理论范畴和理论分析方法，得出一些与现实相冲突的理论结论，将制度分析引向理论的死胡同；（3）通过吸收各种可替代分析框架的有用成分、总结理论批判的思维线索、细化马克思的宏观动态分析框架，可以提出一种“权力——效率”制度分析框架以超越交易费用分析框架，并最终说明交易费用分析框架是一个不但存在许多致命的理论缺陷，而且可以被抛弃的制度理论分析框架。为论证这些结论，全文从以下几个方面来展开理论批判分析。

在第一章中，本文首先指出，科斯定理是新制度经济学和交易费用分析框架得以确立的核心基础理论。因为在许多新经济自由主义者看来，科斯定理通过零交易费用分析工具，超越了“看不见的手”理论假说和福利经济学基本定理，瓦解了传统的“权力—效率”分析框架和“结构—效率”分析框架，将资源配置效率和制度的存在更为一般地归结为交易费用，在反驳各种理论的攻击的同时，为经济自由主义进入到实证主义分析阶段奠定了理论基础。因此，如果科斯定理不成立，那么新制度经济学家就无法利用交易费用分析框架完全地说明各种制度绩效问题，交易费用分析框架也就无法超越并取代其他效率分析框架。其次较为详尽地讨论了科斯定理，得出了以下结论：科斯定理表述纷杂、内涵模糊，即使在理想状态下，它也是一个不成立的理论假说。因为它忽视了以下几种十分重要的理论问题：①收入分配以及补偿交易本身是生产过程中不可分割的部分，激励效应无法通过再分配或补偿交易加以消除（激励效应）；②在完全信息状态下，厂商无法实行完全价格歧视，“结构--垄断”分析方法在零交易费用状态下也有存在的合理性（结构--垄断分析方法）；③双边垄断谈判议价中，即使交易费用为零，由于外部性商品的定价决定于双方谈判力量的分布状况，从而谈判力量的分布状况决定了资源配置最终结果的分布状态，所以“权力分析方法”具有存在的合理性（权力分析方法）；④不同的权利初始分配，以及在商品议价中不同的谈判力量，将改变交易者的财富收入状况，并产生在宏观经济中十发重要的财富效应问题，以及微观的收入效应和合作解空集等问题。并由于积分路径依赖等问题，只有从宏观结构权力分布和微观行为特性两种角度，财富收入分配效应才能完全把握它对资源配置效率的影响（财富收入分配效应）；⑤道德人的良心将使权利的分配即使在理想状态下也会对资源配置的效率产生影响（良心效应）；⑥瓦尔拉斯竞争机制并不需要完全信息的假设，零交易费用分析框架错误地理解了竞争的含义（一般均衡理论）；⑦在动态规划中，资源配置效率可能与交易费用无关（动态规划）。所以，效率问题不能完全归结为交易费用问题，决定制度绩效的因素并不仅仅有交易费用因素，交易费用分析框架在处理宏观、微观、动态等方面的经济绩效问题时必定遗漏许多重要的理论范畴（如权力结构），它不能完全取代传统的“结构—效率”和“权力—效率”分析框架。最后，在批判规范的科斯定理的基础上，对一些修正的科斯定理进行了批判，指出阿罗版本的科斯定理、新兴古典版本的科斯定理和政治科斯定理都是不成立的，各种修正的科斯定理不能证明私有制的优越性和合理性。

在第二章中，首先论述了交易费用概念无法清晰化是“理性—最大化—均衡”分析框架向制度分析扩展的必然产物。因为，决定制度存在和制度绩效的各种理论范畴（如信息、不确定性、外部性等）与“理性—最大化—均衡”分析框架存在许多不可调和的矛盾。新经济自由主义为了调和这些不可调和的矛盾，并将各自由主义流派统一起来，提出了交易费用这个中介概念。这决定了交易费用内涵的模糊化，它与信息、不确定性、外部性等理论范畴间的关系本身就不存在可清楚认识的客观基础；其次论证了，利用交易费用作为评价制度绩效的效率标准是一种无法成立的理论处理方法。一是从制度最优分析框架中引伸出的交易费用定义必定涉及到帕累托效率标准。而在制度分析中，由于存在以下理论问题：（1）社会福利函数的存在性问题（阿罗不可能定理）；（2）社会福利函数的可得性问题（信息收集问题）；（3）西托夫斯基悖论；（4）次优定理问题。我们不但无法进行不同帕累托最优均衡的比较，也无法进行帕累托最优与非帕累托最优、非帕累托最优与非帕累托最优间的比较。而且帕累托最优标准并非新制度经济学家所认为的那样是一个超价值的分析工具，它隐含了许多与制度分析相冲突的价值规范标准；二是由于加总问题、一般均衡的前提假设问题、分工和技术与交易费用和生产收益间的互动关系问题、动态技术创新问题，使交易成本比较分析无法在动态和宏观的视野下进行。在一定意义上，交易费用并非是制度非绩效的根源和标志，它是人们在动态世界中，为获取来自社会分工协作的收益而必须付出的代价。因此，单纯从交易费用角度来分析和刻画制度绩效在理论上是不成立的。随后分析了动态宏观世界中的交易性质，以及交易维度和交易费用与生产收益、技术和分工间的关系，得出了以下结论：要想真正洞察动态宏观世界中制度的性质，必须从生产方式决定交易方式等角度来把握社会中各集团的利益冲突和利益依存机制，新制度经济学所强调的交易费用范畴不但不利于直接把握问题的本质，反而会因错误地理解康芒斯的“交易”概念而而错误地归结制度的本质。在此基础上，我们证明了“政治市场”、“政治科斯定理”和“政治交易费用”因错误理解政治相互作用、将“政治中的各种关系错误地理解为行动中的”契约关系”，而是一些不成立的理论概念。最后我们详细论述了交易费用分析工具不但不能排除规范价值分析的干扰，而且会因它不具有可测量性而不具有现实的操作性，得出交易费用这种中介概念是一个在制度实证分析和规范分析中无用的、多余的概念。

在批判交易费用分析框架的核心基础理论、核心基本概念、效率标准以及其他基本范畴的基础上，第三章对交易费用分析框架中的主要流派进行了批判。该批判首先指出了各流派的理论缺陷，然后进行了进一步说明和总结，指出制度经济学的核心问题不应当只是强调制度的重要性，而是要解决“权利结构与（潜在）效率结构”间的冲突问题，建立在交易费用分析框架之上的制度分析是无法胜任这一理论问题的。

在第四章中，论文从方法论的角度对交易费用分析框架进行了深入分析，指出从交易费用角度来认识社会制度绩效问题，必定导致制度心理个体主义、契约主义、功能主义。这些分析方法都存在许多致命得理论缺陷。1）必定导致“社会与人”相互决定、无限倒推的理论悖论，从而只有抽象地构建人类行为理论，并无法处理“个体意识”、“社会”、“国家”等整体范畴的起源问题；2）只有将人处理为“无差别”、“平等”、“自由”的抽象人，错误地将人类相互作用归结为抽象的契约行动，从而陷入社会契约理论的困境之中，错误而简单地将人类社会冲突的根源归结为个体机会主义，认为制度存在的基础是因为机会主义行为的存在，而将社会集团间更本质的客观利益冲突忽略掉，忽视了对社会生产结构的认识，并从社会生产领域中来把握社会利益冲突和制度绩效的根源。3）“理性—最大化—均衡”分析框架在动态宏观制度分析中必然导致功能主义分析，使诺斯主观地、错误地归结外部刺激与行为反应、社会功能需求与社会结构起源变迁之间的关系。

为了彻底地驳倒交易费用分析框架，第五章在理论批判的基础上进行了理论构建。首先对演进经济学、新左派、激进经济学所提供的可替代交易费用分析框架的制度分析方法进行了分析，得出这些流派所提供的框架在本质上无法超越交易费用分析框架；其次对马克思制度分析框架进行了分析 ，得出马克思制度分析框架具有交易费用分析框架难以媲美的制度分析方法和宏观动态理论基础，通过细化马克思制度理论，可以彻底地超越交易费用分析框架；然后在总结前面各章批判分析的基础上，得出了一系列细化马克思宏观动态制度分析框架的理论线索和理论切入点，提出了马克思制度理论的微观基础（行为理论和选择理论）、权力分析框架（宏观权力分析框架和微观权力分析框架）、分工理论和一元多线制度变迁理论。通过这些经过细化的理论能够全面地解决交易费用分析框架已经解决和尚未解决的制度理论问题。最后，在总结前面的各种分析的基础上，简略地分析了未来制度分析框架的理论构建问题，提出“权力——效率”制度分析框架应是未来制度分析的发展方向。

Abstract

The standpoint of this thesis is that institution analysis conducted from the angle of transaction cost cannot grasp the nature of institution and source of economic performance completely. It reaches many theoretical conclusions conflicting with reality, which is based on the wrong key basic theory, key concept and methodology, and leads institution analysis to the dead end in the theory. So, rooted on the following arguments, this thesis try to carry on the theoretical criticism and analysis, and further reaches relevant theoretical conclusion.

Firstly, in the beginning of Chapter 1, this thesis points out why Coase theorem is the core basic theory of the new institution economics and the frame of analyzing the transaction cost. The reason is that many new economic liberalists have proved that Coase theorem transcends the hypothesis of “invisible hand” theorem and the basic theorem of welfare economics by using the analyzing tools of zero transaction cost. And it disintegrates the traditional analyzing frame of “power-efficiency” and “structure-efficiency” and contributes the resource allocation efficiency and existence of institution to transaction cost. While facing attack of refuting various theories, it lay a theoretical foundation for the economic liberalism going into the analyzing phase of positivism. If Coase theorem is not right, neo-institution economists cannot use the analyzing frame of transaction cost to explain all kinds of questions of institution performance very well, and then the analyzing frame of transaction cost cannot transcend other analyzing frames of efficiency. Secondly, after detailed discussion of Coase theorem, this thesis obtains following results. As a theoretical hypothesis of Coase theorem, so many explained ways do not make its intention clear; Even in a ideal state, it’s still not right, because it ignore the following important facts. (1) income distribution and compensation transaction themselves is one indivisible part of production process, and re-distribution and compensation transaction cannot eliminate incentive effect; (2) in the state of complete information, firms implement complete price discrimination. In the state of zero transaction cost, the analyzing method of structure-monopoly is reasonable; (3)during the bargain of bilateral monopoly negotiation, even the transaction cost is zero, the distribution state of resource allocation is decided by the relative distribution state of power of negotiation. The method of analyzing power is reasonable; (4) different initial distribution of right and power of negotiation in the bargain will change dealers’ wealth condition, and cause the wealth effect in the macroeconomic and micro-income effect and empty cooperative solution etc. And because the integral pass dependence, the influence to resource allocation efficiency caused by wealth and income and distribution effect cannot being grasped very well unless under two kinds of angles, which is power distribution of macro-structure and micro-behavior character; (5)even in the ideal state, the distribution of power will influence the efficiency of resource allocation because of the conscience of moral people (conscience effect); (6)the hypothesis of complete information is not suit for Walras competition. Zero transaction cost make a misunderstanding about competition (General equilibrium theorem); (7)in the dynamic programme, because the efficiency maybe have nothing to do with transaction cost, efficiency cannot be equal to transaction cost. Institution performance is not just decided by the transaction cost, because the analyzing frame of transaction cost omits some important theoretical category (e.g.. power structure) in the process of economic performance both in macro, micro and dynamic field. It cannot replace traditional analyzing frame of “structure-efficiency” and “power-efficiency” completely. At last, on the basis of criticism the normative Coase theorem, this thesis criticize some revised version. It points out that the version of both arrow and new neo-classical and political Coase theorem is not reasonable, because Coase theorem can’t prove the superiority and reasonability of private property right system.

 At first, chapter 2 advocates the ambiguity of the definition of transaction cost is the product of the analysis system of “ rationality-maxmization-equilibriem ,“ because many categories which determine the existence of institutions and the institutional performance such as information, uncertainty and exterality, cannot be harmonious with the analysis system of “ rationality-maxmization-equilibriem “, the new economic liberalism bring out the definition of transaction cost to mediate the contradict between them. This determines the ambiguity. Second, we prove the institutional efficiency standard is wrong .1)the definition of transaction cost which derives from the optimum analysis of institutions must involve the Pareot efficiency standard.This will result in many theoretic problems, such as the problem of social welfare function, information collecting problem, the Setovsty paradox and second best theorem. So we cannot carry out the comparison between the state of Pareot and the state of non-Pareot, and the comparison between the states of non-Pareot. More importance is that the Pareot standard isn’t beyond many value standards which are contradict with the institution analysis; 2)Because of the addition problem, the hypothesis of the general equilibrium, the interaction relation between technology , division and production cost, transaction cost, the problem of technical creations, we cannot carry out the comparative analysis in the field of the macro-dynamic world. So it is very difficult to analyze and measure the institutional performance from the angle of transaction costs. Then we analyze the nature of transaction in the macro-dynamic world and the relation between categories in transaction cost economics. We demonstrate if we want to catch the nature of institutions in the macro-dynamic world, we have to recognize the interest conflict among social groups and the interest dependent system from the angle that the mode of product determines the mode of transaction. The transaction cost category which the new institution economics emphasizes isn’t useful to catch the nature of problems, on the contrary it will mistakenly understand the nature of institutions by misunderstanding the definition transaction of Commons’. On basis of these, we prove “political market”,” political Coase theorem” and “political transaction cost” aren’t right definitions because the new institution economics misunderstands the political interaction and mistakenly attributes it to the contract relation. Finally, we demonstrate that the analysis tool of transaction cost not only cannot exclude the interference of value norms, but also isn’t operable in reality because it isn’t measurable. The conclusion is that the definition of transaction cost is a useless, and unnecessary definition in the positive and normative institution analysis.

    On the basis of the critique of the basic core theories , the basic definition , the efficiency standard and other basic categories in the analysis system of transaction cost, chapter 3 criticizes the main schools of the transaction cost economics, This criticism shows theirs faults and then gives more explanation and conclusions. It maintains the core problem of the institutional economics doesn’t lie in the importance of institutions,  on the contrary it is the conflicts between the structure of rights and that of the potential efficiency .The institutional analysis builds on the analysis system of transaction cost isn’t competent to the problem .

In the chapter four, this thesis inquires into the analysis system of transaction cost more deeply from the angle of methodology. The conclusion is that here must be many theoretic mistakes if we recognize the problem of social institutional performance from the point of transaction cost because it will result in institutional individualism, contractism and functionalism. 1)it will result in the paradox about “the society determines the individual, the individual determine the society”, so new institutional economists have to built the behavior theory abstractly and cannot deal with problems about how “ideology”, ”society” and “state” originate; 2)they have deal with human being as “indifferent”, ”equal” and “free” people, which will attribute people’s interaction to the abstract action with contracts mistakenly ,and drop into the dilemma of the social contract theory, and attribute the origin of social conflicts to the individual opportunism and the existence  of institution to  that of opportunism behavior. So they have to ignore the more essential objective interest conflicts between social group and the recognition of social production structure. 3)The analysis system of “rationality—maximization—equilibrium” must result in functionalism in the dynamic-macro-institutional analysis, which causes North mistakenly and subjectively conclude the relation between the external stimulation and behavior reaction, and the relation between the need of social function between the origin and change of social structure.

In order to smash the analysis system of transaction cost completely, on the basis of the analyses of the above chapters, chapter 5 brings a reasonable institutional analysis system for future by absorbing the nutrition of Marxism and the school of evolutional economics. Its purpose is to indicate the analysis system of transaction cost not only has many mistakes, but also it is a system which can be abandoned and replaced. The analysis system of ”power –efficiency” is the best substitution because it integrate Marxism ‘s macro—institution analysis system with comparative static-micro-institution analysis system